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The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as
well as support from the government and from private foundations, have
made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated
center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their
relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely
positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related
resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as
well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely,
education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates
both to its sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese
science and technology and on how that science and technology is
managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT and LAW REFORM IN CHINA:
A RULE OF LAW, NOT OF MAN;
SOLUTION OR SAFEGUARD IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY CHINA?
by
Dr. Richard L. Thurston, Esq.
Vice President, Corporate Staff &
Assistant General Counsel, Texas Instruments'
INTRODUCTION
Proliferation of trade disputes during our lifetime has
captured the full attention of the U.S. Congress, the American
press and corporate executives alike. Concerns are rooted in
perceptions that most developing countries exploit trade
barriers to compensate for certain inefficiencies in their
domestic economies and competitiveness abroad. Along with the
demands for "leveling the playing field" have come outcries
for judicial and administrative reforms in countries such as
China. Just as critics seek to "westernize" China's economy,
so, too, have they argued for pervasive law reform.
While some limited degree of continued "westernization"
of China's laws and legal system may be desirable to address
the ever changing requirements of a developing market economy,
any demands for the restructuring of China's judicial system
by extensive transplanting of foreign legal concepts is
1 Dr. Thurston, earned a Ph.D in modern East Asian history
from the University of Virginia and a J.D. from Rutgers University
School of Law, Camden, N. J. Among his responsibilities at TI, he
is Asia-Pacific Regional Counsel and Merger and Acquisitions
Counsel.
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inappropriate and nonresponsive to the fundamental issues in
question. U.S. businessmen can obtain some level of assurance
that the current trend towards meaningful law reform in China
can be validated by Chinese history. Furthermore, that history
has shown that foreign'investment can be adequately protected
once economic stability allows for judicial stability to
emerge.
The End of Communist Ideological Legitimacy
An accelerating decline of centralized national authority
coupled with the disintegration of the ideological tutelage of
the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") could ignite a new era of
intense political instability and economic chaos for China.
Unless a viable alternative to communist party ideological
legitimacy is clearly identified and credibly substituted, the
PRC may be constrained (perhaps irreparably) from reaching its
fullest economic potential. The need to find a workable
alternative to the communist solution for achieving "wealth
and power" will become all-the-more imperative should the
current excesses of unbalanced prosperity and growing individ-
ual and economic-oriented crimes continue to challenge the
credibility of the central government, thereby usurping the
mandate to rule from the leadership of post-Mao China. To what
should the CCP turn in addressing this challenge?
The CCP's ascendancy to national power in the late 1940's
depended, in part, on its leaders' abilities successfully to
maintain influence over the proletarian masses. While the key
tenets of such control were party propaganda, central organi-
zation, and the elimination of poverty of the vast majority of
the Chinese peoples, the CCP sought to establish a new revolu-
tionary developmental model of a rule of man, resulting in a
theoretical egalitarian order.
In proclaiming the new era, the CCP rejected pre-1949
Kuomintang policies for achieving wealth and power. Instead,
more dramatic, pragmatic solutions to national hunger,
poverty, economic deprivation and foreign domination were
offered through Maoist ideological purity (conformity), party
leadership (discipline), and implementation of the Chinese
variant of communism via administrative and military "guid-
ance."
Through tactics establishing ideologically "correct"
relational structures associated with egalitarian mass line
politics, Mao's social revolution successfully destroyed,
albeit temporarily, many traditional socio-economic struc-
tures. But, as Chou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others would
discover, the effectiveness of an ideology and politics which
draws its sustenance from a pure rule of man philosophy must
be, of necessity, short-lived. Such ideological orientation,
eviscerated by deficient and misplaced economic planning
policies and erroneous long-term utopian visions, encountered
consistent obstacles to societal betterment, resulting in
3
successive economic disasters from the mid-fifties through the
Cultural Revolution.
Today's China confronts a parlous incubus arising from
serious internal contradictions. A highly volatile "Gold Rush"
mentality among the Chinese populace within the southern and
coastal regions juxtaposed with a deep sense of frustration,
if not betrayal, in regions overlooked by the current round of
economic development, threaten stability and prospects for
sustained prosperity and increased foreign investment.
Hopefully, Deng's succession leadership will realize
expediently that a successful, sustained advancement of both
economic reform and national development into the 21st Century
is increasingly dependent on China's ability to provide its
peoples with economic stability, balanced financial gain and
comparative commercial freedom. Such economic freedom and
prosperity, in turn, are dependent on the regime's success in
recalibrating its ideological formula to adopt increasingly a
more traditional rule of law, not one of man, and to use the
legal system to control the excesses of the new socialism.
The real test will be graded on how well China achieves
and maintains the delicate balance between the supremacy of
law in commercial/transactional relationships and the general
Confucian proclivity to the influence of li (morality-propri-
ety) in socio-political affairs. In so doing, the state may be
forced during an interim period to sacrifice certain political
"freedoms" common in Western democracies for the sake of
4
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economic development and order. But, such metamorphosis should
not impact significantly the status of foreign investment
throughout China.
The challenge - of balancing political with commercial
relationships - is not new to China. Throughout Chinese
history, whenever the rule by men failed to maintain the
"mandate of heaven", legal reform was often resorted to in an
attempt to preserve or re-establish order.
The Beginning of a New Long arch u
The highly publicized economic reform campaign of the
"Four Modernizations" of the late 1970's and early 1980's
delimited the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution and a renewed
search by China for wealth and power. This campaign sparked
significant Chinese political and academic debate over many
issues, most particularly the core of modernization concerns:
how to eliminate "judicial" anarchy throughout China (during
that era this effort was often referred to as the "fifth"
modernization).
Following on the heels of senseless economic disruption
and depravity of the Cultural Revolution, post-Mao leadership
determined that nascent economic modernization would require
the strengthening of the socialist legal system. During the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in July
1979, Hua Guofeng discussed openly the importance of imple-
5
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menting wide-ranging judicial reform:
"Strengthening our socialist democracy and social-
ist legal system is urgently needed to consolidate
the socialist state system...to solidify the polit-
ical foundation on which the country can carry out
socialist modernization in stability and unity, to
bring into full play the enthusiasm and initiative
of all of our people in modernization..."'
He also argued that promulgation of economic-based laws was a
pre-requisite to successfully implementing modernization, thus
representing a material change in the philosophy of the CCP.
Even though China possesses a significant legal heri-
tage,3 most commerce and economic-related laws were revoked
by the Communist Chinese leadership after their ascension to
power. Not only did the CCP attack such laws as being archaic
remnants of a decadent KMT rule, Maoist ideology excoriated
codified commercial laws as being inappropriate for a society
established on egalitarian order.
Emerging from the deprivations of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Hua was concerned that, in a China devoid of such laws,
the Chinese government could shun its new constitutional duty
to protect the right of its citizens "to own lawfully earned
2FBIS, 10 July 1979, L.3, as quoted in an editorial of the
People's Daily, 5 July 1979.
3A criminal legal code had been established in China during
the T'ang Dynasty (618 A.D. to 907 A.D.). But, a civil code
incorporating commercial concepts was not promulgated until the
"Republican Era" of KMT rule in pre-1949 China.
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income, savings, houses, and other means of livelihood".' For
China, which bore deep ruts from the wheels of its customs,
Hua's statement amplified a perception of a recurring phenome-
non in its political history: once a government unresponsive
to the people's needs had been overthrown, then long-term
stability could be maintained through legal reform.
Contemporaneous with Hua's speech, the government an-
nounced that it would draft a civil law in the spirit of the
new economic reforms then being discussed. That pronouncement
led to widespread debate not only about whether China should
adopt such a law, but also as to the appropriate form of law
itself. In Democracy and Legal System, for example, Jiang Wei
and Yang Dawen queried whether a civil law was compatible with
a socialist democracy. Both historical experience and the
actual needs of China's developing economy convinced the
authors of the validity of their opinion.
It was the "inseparable relationship of civil law with
commercial development" which required China's leadership to
consider adopting a civil code. After all, Jiang and Yang
reckoned, "Marx said that commercial products cannot walk by
themselves to the market for exchange. "5 In order to recon-
struct and then to modernize its economy, the CCP chose to use
'As set forth in Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution, adopted
at the Fifth National People's Congress, 5 March 1978. Printed in
Chuna-hua Ren-min Gun-he Guo Di Wu Jie Chuan-uo Ren-min Dai-byau
Da Hui. Di-vi Tz Hi-- len Jim, Beijing, 1978.
'Jiang Wei and Yang Dawen, "We Must Establish a Civil Law," 1
Democracy and Law 18, 1978.
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civil law to guide and discipline the proletariat. With that
objective in mind, in 1979 the CCP began the first phase of a
second long march towards establishing a new society dictated
by a rule of law and not of man.
Although 1979 was a very pivotal year in the economic
purging of post-liberation communist excesses, the signifi-
cance of the new legal reform was not lost to the new leader-
ship. Nevertheless, law and its resulting order had to remain
subservient, temporarily, to the overriding principles of a
Marxist proletarian democracy struggling to find its economic
self. Thus, the fundamental purpose for the creation of new
laws and their enforcement throughout the early 1980's was
twofold: (i) to control all activities which could jeopardize
socialist security and disrupt social order; and (ii) second-
arily, to provide a basic legal framework within which to
attract and to secure foreign trade and investment in the
future. Since societal stability was paramount, major
emphasis initially was placed on confronting directly exces-
sive influence exerted by party cadres during the Cultural
Revolution:
"The cadres at all levels and the party members
should become models in observing the law and
leaders in executing the state laws. However,
certain cadres have a very weak concept of the
legal system and some could even be described as
lawless. n6
6Foreign Broadcast Information Service ("FBIS") 11/28/79, p.3,
Guangzhou Nanfang Riba (11/18/79, p.l).
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It was incumbent on the CCP and each of its party members
to accept both the ideologically and economically strategic
importance of a fair judiciary and equitable legal system in
protecting the new socialist order. Why? Inorder to prevent
re-emergence of personal abuses and disruptions to modern-
ization, such as the rightist errors attributed to Lin Biao
and Chiang Ching, a new legal order would make it more
difficult for an individual or group of individuals to
manipulate either the masses or the party line for the faux
sake of ideological purity. Recent history revealed that:
"As time went on, [the CCP] grew accustomed to our own
way of doing things and felt that this was convenient.
What a lot of trouble those laws would give us! We began
to refer to this or that law. How convenient it was to go
without law!...The socialist legal system should have
been practiced with intensified efforts long ago..."
Modernization of twentieth century Chinese society has
always required the masses, acting through a new, enlightened
party leadership, to enact new laws designed to protect more
clearly the proletarian democracy by establishing a unified
national observance of the same laws. No fundamental differ-
ence exists this time around.
Post-Mao leadership sought to establish quickly a new
legal structure which could assist effectively in the develop-
ment of a more economically stable social order, thereby
averting further revolutionary or anarchistic upheaval.
7FBIS, 11/28/79, 1.3, Hongqi (11/2/79,, pp, 3-7).
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Accordingly, new principles for the socialist legal system
were to be adopted throughout China:
"1. Truly implement the principle that all people
are equal before their own laws;
2. The proletariat's judicial organs must main-
tain independence of judicial procedures;
3. Insist on action according to law;
4. Strictly distinguish between what con-
stitutes a crime and what does not;
5. Oppose the will and intentions of superiors;
6. Laws and systems must have stability, continu-
ity and great authority;
7. Do a good job of building up the courts.
Courts at all levels are currently generally
under-staffed. There are more cases than can
be handled, many court personnel still have
other things to do; and
8. Judges must be faithful to the laws and the
system, to the people and to the facts." 8
Under this approach, the legal system and the judiciary would
serve as arbitrators in readjusting civil and economic.
relationships amongst the state, the collectives and individu-
als. In particular, the mission of the new socialist legal
system was:
"...protecting the legitimate interests of individ-
ual citizens, developing a new type of relations
between the people and strengthening unity among
the people to serve the four modernizations through
the settling of all kinds of disputes over proper-
ty, rights, benefits, marriage, and family prob
'FBIS, L.2, 2/8/79.
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lems...to correctly handle contradictions among the
peoples, readjust the relations of production not
in harmony with the development of productive
forces, developing an excellent situation of sta-
bility and unity and serving the four moderniz-
ations."n
Through Hua's vision, the CCP embarked upon an irrevers-
ible course to expand the scope of a legal system which would
promote/protect the new post-Mao socialist democratic order.
In 1979, the justification for law reform did not yet fully
lie in economic development and foreign investment. While many
of the laws were oriented pragmatically towards satisfying
certain Western commercial interests , the ultimate goal
remained one of seeking a transitional social foundation for
a broader philosophy for achieving national wealth and power.
All-the-while, the principal focus centered on avoiding the
excesses of the Cultural Revolution so that the masses would
never again suffer such economic hardships, deprivations, and,
senseless destruction of lives.
The methods of dictatorship allegedly promoted by the
"Gang of Four" became the principal target of the reformist
party element. Errant policies of certain party members and
red guard cadres were attacked because they promoted the
9FBIS, 4/4/79, L.4, from the minutes of the Civil Trial
Conference of the Shanghai Municipal Higher People's Court, held on
March 17-30, 1979. Similar comments came from all other reporting
courts.
1°Cite examples of several of the key laws such as Joint
Venture, tax, foreign exchange legislation, etc.
11
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retrogression of the livelihood and prosperity so eagerly
awaited by the masses. By the late 1970's and early 1980's
the ills of the Cultural Revolution generated among many a
longing for law and order:
"the people [were] craving for law...the people of the
whole country [were] eagerly demanding a sound legal
system... to effectively guarantee the peoples' demo-
craic rights provided for by the Constitution and
constantly develop stability and unity."ll
To a growing majority of the masses, a return to law and order
offered the hope of eliminating terror, restoring stability
and providing prosperity to a long-suffering people.
During the subsequent ten years leading to the Tiananmen
Incident, references to a rule of law would only occasionally
find their way into comments of Deng and others, but never as
the driving force for economic reform. But, the eruption of
decades of pent-up frustrations during the Tiananmen Incident
in June 1979 drove home to certain post-Mao Chinese leadership
serious concerns for societal stability during transitional
reform and ultimately sparked the development of the second
phase of the second long march into the twentieth century.
1 FBIS, 7/5/79, 1.9, from Peng Zhen's speech on June 26, 1979,
on the Seven Draft laws then being proposed to the Second Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress.
12
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ontemporary Lal Refor Initiatives: A Proloue
Statements on law reform attributable to various CCP
officials during the last several years exhibit remarkable
similarities to the thoughts and philosophies expressed during
1979. For example, Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Commit-
tee of the Eighth National People's Congress, noted that China
must "promptly formulate a number of new laws governing the
socialist market economy... the NPC must give top priority to
the enactment of economic laws. " 12 Qiao went on to contend:
"... a market economy requires a sound and comprehensive
legal system ... the history of economic development in
modern states has proved that without sound legal
standards or guarantees, the various social and economic
activities will have no guidelines thus inevitably
leading to chaos... Chinese laws should be made compati-
ble with international laws and internationally accepted
practices to help China's economy to compete global-
ly. 1113
Similarly, Vice Premier Qian Qichen opined that it was
necessary to create a clearer legal framework as a prerequi-
site to lasting economic reform.'
In calling for deeper economic reform, PRC President
Jiang Zemin has asserted that "the old Administrative means
should not be used... cadres at all levels should seriously
'2 Xinhua General News Service, 2 April 1993, Item No. 0402045
1 Xinhua General News Service, April 1993; Item No. 0401109.
1' As reported in The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly,
September 13, 1992 at p.3.
13
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study the basic knowledge and the laws that guide the develop-
ment of the socialist market economy."1 5 Therefore, under
the reform agenda, macro-economic control technically equates
to prioritizing economic and legal measures over administra-
tive control and guidance.
Before more closely examining the elements of contempo-
rary legal reform being discussed and any relationship it may
have with the proposed new economic order, some of the
historical roots of "rule of law" in early twentieth century
China should be examined. Within those glimpses into the past
a new insight into the role of legal reform in China can be
gleamed, which history will help to establish a more proper
perspective on present reform initiatives.
Historical Roots in Twentieth Century China
Historically, China has fluctuated between a rule by
custom and moral example (rule of man) and control by regula-
tions and punishment (rule of law). Throughout the millennium
prior to 1949, China evolved a highly refined legal system
based on a strictly defined interrelationship of li (customary
morality-propriety) and fa (punishment). The li formed the
basis of societal rules and education while the fa was often
a tool for its implementation. However, when the li failed to
5 Xinhua General News Service, 14 May 1993, Item No. 0514155.
14
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maintain an acceptable level of people's livelihood, legal
reform employing fa, to one degree or another, provided a
remedy.
Travelling back into a recent historical era - the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - we discover that
the new economic relationships then being established through-
out China posed the most serious threat to Chinese sovereignty
and stability. Expanded trade with western nations barraged
China with western commercial law concepts which were much
more complicated than those with which Chinese merchants had
become familiar, for example: bankruptcy, agency, brokerage,
carriage, bills of lading, etc. Rights and obligations
increasingly became less governed by interaction among closely
related groups of kinship than by individualistic, impersonal
mercantile relationships.
Those new relationships were not singularly disruptive of
Chinese society. However, when combined with increasing decen-
tralization of government authority and the erosion of
administrative control, the societal fabric of China unrav-
elled rapidly to the extent that early twentieth century
Chinese society teetered on the brink of partition by foreign
powers, civil war and revolution. Incessant warfare subse-
quently erupted throughout much of rural China during a period
commonly referred to as the "Warlord Era".
In the early twentieth century certain Chinese literati
and politicians recognized the urgency of enacting pervasive
15
political and judicial reforms to preserve Chinese society.
Proliferation of the foreign presence on Chinese territory and
the growth, let alone the increasing complexity of commercial
transactions, required an internationalization and unification
of China's laws and judiciary, including a greater emphasis on
the "rule of law" for commercial affairs and relationships.
Accordingly, a new era of legal reform blossomed in China.
Institution of both a rule of law as well as the principles of
"Science and Democracy" offered solutions to China's ills.
Consequently, from 1904 to 1929 successive Chinese law
revision commissions investigated, digested and analyzed then-
contemporary Western and Japanese laws. They simultaneously
collected and summarized thousands of disparate customary laws
in force throughout China. Early twentieth century law reform
was two-fold in character: new courts were created throughout
the country, followed by the enactment of substantive and
procedural codes. As to the newly established judiciary, the
reformists determined that China would respond adequately to
modernization pressures only if the new courts were able to
achieve independence from the dominant political part(ies) and
politicians. Furthermore, the judiciary would have to imple-
ment a unified interpretation of new laws and enforce them on
a national basis.
Although most Chinese geographic regions which were
subjected to incessant warlord incursions or foreign treaty
rights succumbed to judicial anarchy, where conditions permit-
16
ted, such as in the coastal regions, a rule by law was
effectuated and increasingly brought new stability and order
to those regions. New law schools opened their doors,
graduating young, albeit often idealistic, lawyers and judges,
such as the venerable John C. H. Wu of Shanghai. They did not
idolize law but often believed that it offered a viable
vehicle by which China's most serious problems could be
addressed and by which the East and West could meet; poten-
tially resulting not only in the stability and territorial
integrity of China, but also in world peace and prosperity.
As a testament to the success of legal reform, litigation
rose significantly as the populace became increasingly con-
vinced of the judicial fairness, and equity of civil and
criminal decisions of the nearly 200 reform courts, including
the Ta Li Yuan (Supreme Court). For example, from 1914 to
1921, cases submitted to the District Courts as Courts of
First Instance increased thirty-three percent from 28,414 to
37,784 annually.l6 Out of Antung (Liaoning), the American
Vice-Consul reported that:
"the general effect of these [District and High]
Courts is very good. The judges are seemingly of a
progressive tendency and their decisions viewed in
light of Western precedents, usually fair and
equitable...""7
16Summarized from "Shen-p'an Ya-men Pieh-shou-chieh Ti-i-shen
An-chien Pi-chiao Tuao" found in Chunga-hua Min-kuo ink-shih T'ung-
chi Nien-pao.
17U.S. Department of State, National Archives, general serial
files, File #893.041/13. D.B. Lasseter to the Secretary of State,
October 26, 1921.
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In many cases, court decisions, especially those of the Ta Li
Yuan, predated comparable decisions by U.S. courts. Many cases
dealt with issues between Chinese and foreign parties success-
fully. That is not to say that corruption did not occur or
that law reform was not without its errors. It did and was.
However, the new judiciary marked a significant improvement
over the conditions existing during the last years of the Qing
dynasty.
In the Fall of 1925, many foreign residents of China
anticipated apprehensively the forthcoming visit of an
International Commission on Extraterritoriality.1 ' After
investigating China's judicial system the Commission would
submit to the Western Powers, Japan and China recommendations
on the future status of extraterritoriality. Predictably,
reports and criticisms of "native" judicial barbarity invaded
China's foreign language press as justification for retention
of extraterritorial privileges.
Several of the articles were penned by Rodney Gilbert, a
vituperate spokesman of the pro-extraterritorial rights
movement. He argued that new laws and procedures could not
alter Chinese moral standards. "They will simply be new
devices behind which a more shameless sport can be made of
justice and its administration." An investigation by Western
jurists and statesmen was unnecessary, he contended. Instead,
~' In 1921, the Washington Naval Conference authorized a
Commission composed of international jurists, statesmen and
businessmen to investigate China's judicial system and laws.
18
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"China should be told firmly and frankly that the evidence
against her fitness to govern her own people and to administer
justice is so overwhelming that it is an insult to the
intelligence of the occidental people..."l'
During the 1920's, many foreigners in China unjustifiably
shared Gilbert's view of a primitive and inefficacious Chinese
judiciary. They linked Chinese law and its reform to Western
concepts of order and political legitimation. In particular,
a western-style constitution was deemed by Western critics to
be a prerequisite to creating a solid foundation for laws
which were to be enacted by a legislature. But, the Western
concept of law and order was alien to the Orient. Instead,
order, then law was more often the cultural norm.
As events unfurled in 1925, it looked as if the Commis-
sion would never have an opportunity to undertake its investi-
gation. The second Chihli-Fengtien War in late 1924 forced
the postponement of the scheduled visit. Other confrontations
also plagued China in late 1924 - early 1925 resulting in
additional delays: a second Kiangsu-Chekiang War was fought
during the winter of 1924 - 1925; Fengtien forces took
Shanghai and; Feng Yu-hsiang's forces consolidated their
position in Hunan and Honan. On May 30, 1925 British Police
19 Rodney Gilbert, "The Extraterritoriality Question - A Case
for Businessmen not Jurists," The North-China Herald and Supreme
Court and Consular Gazette (NCH), November 7, 1925, p. 271.
19
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killed thirteen demonstrators on Nanking Road in Shanghai.20
Despite the unstable environment, in October 1925 the
Ministry of Justice sent to the Western Powers formal invita-
tions to attend in China a December 12th convening of the
International Commission. On January 12, 1926, after several
delays, the International Commission on Extraterritoriality
held its first session in Peking.21 From January through
April, the Commission received and reviewed translations of
China's laws, draft codes and reports on court organization
prepared by Chang Yao-tseng's Extraterritorial Commission.
Occasionally during this period, the delegates would visit a
local prison or court as they did on February 1st when they
visited the Supreme Court, Chihli High Court and a Peking
prison. Another visit scheduled for February 2nd was canceled
when court officials and employees of the Ministry of Justice
went on a nine-day strike in protest of the delinquent payment
of wages.22
The Commissioners were impressed by the "beautifully
20 Other disturbances were reported in Hankow and Shamen in
Canton.
21 Delegates from thirteen nations participated on Commission
which simultaneously investigated China's judicial order and
discussed tariff rates. Silas Strawn of the United Sates was
selected Chairman and Wang Chung-hui, honorary President. D/S File
#793.003C73/241 and 793.003C73/257, Silas Strawn to the Secretary
of State, January 11, 1926 and January 21, 1926, respectively.
22 D/S File #793.003C73/279,280. Strawn to Secretary of
State, March 1, 1926 and March 12, 1926, respectively.
20
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printed laws" but believed them to be meaningless because of
the overly generalized perceived inability of the courts to
enforce them. Most distressing was the conclusion reached by
Commissioner Silas Strawn that the major weakness of the laws,
whether promulgated or not, lay in the fact that China lacked
a Constitution which would provide a legal basis for the
laws.23 This and similar attitudes reveals a flaw in the
Commission study - an underlying belief that inorder for laws
to be enforceable, they must both gain their legitimacy from
a Constitution and be mandated by a Western-style legislature.
Little did Strawn understand that the Chinese judiciary, one
of the oldest in the world, had survived centuries without a
Constitutional basis. What was needed in China to insure
justice was not a Constitution but order and a government
capable of promoting that order. We should not lose track of
that prerequisite today!
Not all people familiar with the Chinese reform efforts
were oblivious to the problems which would materialize further
as China attempted to adopt and assimilate occidental laws.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for example, recognized that judicial
reform sought -
"to produce in and for China a body of laws which
will meet with the approval of all of the important
treaty powers....The inevitable result...will be
that the codes contain many provisions which are
21
23 Ii.
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not an outgrowth of Chinese thought and experience,
which are inconsistent with Chinese conceptions,
and which will run counter to traditional Chinese
habits and practices. If China's new laws satisfy
the foreigners, will they be suited to the Chinese?
If they are suited to the Chinese, will they satis-
fy the foreigners? Can there be produced a system
of law which, both as to regulations and adminis-
tration, can be applied equally, with justice and
with satisfaction, to the Chinese and nationals of
some twenty powers who reside, travel and do busi-
ness in China?""
The answer to his last question was and remains "yes"!
The solution, however, required (then and now) both domestic
stability and foreign patience which would allow China to
effectuate and to perfect a level of judicial reform which
acquires legitimacy from Chinese customs and traditions, not
solely Western politico-judicial concepts. It was equally
important for Western nationals resident in and doing business
in China to discard their ethnocentrism and cultural imperial-
ism.
The Commission had originally planned to stay only one or
two months in Peking in order to make preliminary investiga-
tion into, and analysis of, the written laws. The remaining
time would be spent touring the provinces in order to examine
the actual conditions of the judiciary. Because of civil
warfare, the Commission, on several occasions, postponed its
24 W. R. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952) pp. 111-112.
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plans for the traveling committee to make the tour.25
Finally, on May 10th, conditions had improved enough so as to
allow the traveling committee to tour several of the Northern
provinces. The tour's itinerary took the committee 4,200
miles, to seven High Courts, thirteen District Courts, one
Branch District Court and two special courts, the latter
located at Harbin.2' On June 16th, after a grueling trip,
the Commissioners returned to Peking. Six days later, the
traveling committee submitted its report to the full Commis-
sion.
In every place visited by the travelling committee,
magistrates no longer exercised judicial functions.27 Conse-
quently, the magistrate's treatment of parties and judicial
issues could not be observed. As to the reform courts
visited, the committee was favorably impressed:
"From information supplied to the committee in
answer to their questions, confirmed as far as
possible by personal observation, the conduct of
cases in modern courts appears such as to give
parties, including accused persons in criminal
cases, an opportunity of being fully heard. The
judges and the procurators seem to be intelligent
and experienced men, familiar with law and proce-
dure applied in the courts, and to give the cases
25 The Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in
China, 1926, p. 149. (Hereinafter, RCE).
26 Ibid., pp.149-156. "Report of the Traveling Committee of
the Extraterritoriality Commission", May 10-June 16, 1926.
27 Ibid., p. 151.
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before them their most careful consideration...The
organization of the courts visited and the proce-
dure followed therein showed considerable uniformi-
ty, and appeared to be in accordance with law and
regulations on the subject, which were studied by
the entire commission at Peking. The records of
the courts appeared to be kept in a very satisfac-
tory manner, without, however, adequate facilities
for protection against loss by fire or theft,
especially in the cases of documents relating to
title of land. The court buildings and general
equipment were satisfactory, and in a few instanced
eminently so.""2
Reports received by the Committee before embarking on the
journey confirmed those observations.
After receiving the traveling committee's report, the
entire Commission began a slow process of drafting a final
report.29 Heated arguments over the content erupted. Never-
theless, on September 16, 1926 a final report, consisting of
four parts, was submitted..30 Wang Chung-hui, China's
Minister of Justice, disagreed vehemently with much of the
analysis. Although he affixed his signature to the final
report, he reserved China's approval of the first three
28 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
29 That the Traveling Committee Report had any bearing on the
final analysis is doubtful. Strawn, in his April 16th report to
Secretary of State Kellogg, had already submitted his tentative
recommendations and proposals. D/S File #793.003C73/297.
30 Part I discussed the historical evolution and contemporary
status of extraterritoriality in China. Part II summarized China's
laws and judiciary. Part III discussed in some detail, primarily
from a political point of view, the administration or justice in
China. Part IV consists of the Commission's recommendations.
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sections. 3
Of all the Commission's observations and conclusions, the
most favorable to China was the Commission's criticism of
extraterritorial rights and privileges. Althoughextraterri-
toriality had been designed to protect foreign interests in
China, the Commission noted that because of the multiplicity
and diversity of the foreign courts, the lack of judicial
training of the diplomatic consulars, extension of jurisdic-
tion over Chinese Nationals and the inviolability of foreign
property, the routine functioning of China's judiciary had
been seriously impaired. 32 In spite of this conclusion, the
Commission could not recommend the immediate relinquishment of
extraterritorial rights and privileges. Only after the
Chinese Government had succeeded in implementing fully the
Commission's other recommendations would the Powers "be
warranted in relinquishing their respective rights of extra-
territoriality." 33 Even then, the choice remained that of
the Powers to make.3'
Commission criticisms of judicial reform focused on the
instability of the political environment and their belief
31 RCE, p. 109. "By signing this report my approval of all
the statements contained in Parts I, II, and III is not to be
implied."
32 Ibid
33 Ibid., Part IV, p. 107.
34 Ibid., p. 108.
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that a foreigner could not receive a "fair" hearing from a
Chinese court. The Commission could neither accept the
absence of a constitutional base nor approve of the Peking
Government's failure to separate the legislative, administra-
tive and judicial powers of it's officials.3 5 It was not
that China's laws failed to provide for formal separation of
powers, they did, but that supposedly the absence of a
controlling central government permitted military interfer-
ence. Nevertheless, only one example of such interference was
cited by the Commission: the arrest and summary execution of
the Chief Justice of the Shantung High Court.36 Because of
such so-called "incessant" military interference, the Commis-
sion concluded that a uniform application of laws was non-
existent .7
Centuries-old philosophy and customs, the Commission
argued, also contributed to the non-uniform application of
laws, and thus the likelihood that the foreign litigant would
not receive a judicious hearing by Chinese courts. The
Commission determined that heavy emphasis on mediation and,
quite ironically, case precedence, were incompatible with the
35 Ibid., p. 51.
36 Ibid., pp. 92-97.
37 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
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requirements of twentieth century China.3' Even the Supreme
Court's interpretations and decisions were reportedly applied
inconsistently from one province to another. But, were these
facts so undesirable or indicative of an archaic judiciary to
justify the continuation of extraterritoriality? Hardly not.
China, in fact, was in the process of developing a well-
reasoned, common-law tradition which was not so inflexible as
to require the dissimilar provinces or districts to apply one
civil law without any deviation. Foreigners could, and did
receive judicious treatment under such conditions. 
On this'point, the German experience in Shantugng after
World War I established that foreign nationals could receive
a fair hearing in Chinese courts. Arising out of a 1921 Sino-
German Agreement, German nationals resident in China were
guaranteed a right to trial in the reform courts. They were
also entitled to be represented by German counsel, interpret-
ers and enjoyed appeal as of right. J. J. Heeren, writing in
the China Weekly eview, noted that the Germans received very
good treatment by the Chinese courts whose decisions were of
"a generally high order." He did not report any case of
"serious miscarriage of justice." 39 In business disagree-
ments the Germans adapted quite successfully to the Chinese
38 Quite ironic, especially when one considers that the
underlying principle of Anglo-American law was and remains,
precedence.
39 Fishel, Extraterritoriality, p. 270.
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practice of commercial arbitration, "using their Chambers of
Commerce as courts of adjustment between their members instead
of going to court." 4'
The Commission also remarked about the flaws and incon-
sistencies in laws already promulgated. The Code of Civil
Procedure, for example, referred to provisions and definitions
in a civil code as of then unpromulgated. But the Commission-
ers failed to realize that the Draft Civil Code had been
applied by the Courts largely as if it had been mandated
legislatively. Overlooked also was an important reason behind
the failure to draft a civil code: many of the Western based
provisions and Chinese customs written into the first draft
were incompatible with China's 1920's attempt to develop its
society. In fact, Chinese such as John C. H. Wu and American
lawyers resident in China of the like N. F. Allman criticized
China's adoption of a codified law, believing that China
should have pursued more steadfastly the course of common-
law.4'
Due to these and other conditions, the Commission noted
that a foreign national could not receive justice from Chinese
courts. The errors referred to by the Commission often were
procedural and not substantive. Procedural deficiencies,
40 Ibid.
41 NCH, N. F. Allman, "Present Day Chinese Law and Courts',
October 17, 1925 and John C. H. Wu, private interviews held in May
1976.
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however are to be expected in any new judicial system,
especially one which is inexperienced and unfamiliar with new
laws. Nevertheless, procedural deficiencies should not be
condoned and, in fact, seldom would they be approved by
China's appellate courts.; The decisions of the Supreme Court,
for example, do not indicate any prejudice on injustice to a
foreigner because of his nationality.
In some degree of fairness to the Commission, conditions
in China during the 1920's were not conducive to the uniform
and consistent application of laws. Many foreign attitudes
were understandable and often justified. How else could an
alien resident feel but seriously endangered when, for
example, during the summer of 1925 serious anti-foreign
protests riots and attacks upon foreign persons and property
erupted in the Yangtze Valley, during which judicial authori-
ties were powerless to intervene.42 Numerous reports of
torture and maltreatment of Chinese prisoners in the interior
could not go unnoticed. But, these matters were not the
result of a barbaric judicial order but of anarchic conditions
in certain areas of China.-
Similarly, the laws which were promulgated by the KMT
were of sufficient completeness and clarity so as to rank them
with the most modern continental European and Japanese codes.
Substantive legal reform encompassed the writing of three
29
42 RCE, P. 97.
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drafts of a Civil Code and its promulgation during 1929 -
1930; new procedural laws were enacted and special laws on
copyrights, bankruptcy, negotiable instruments, corporations,
etc. were promulgated to facilitate trade, most especially
with the foreigners. By 1930, China possessed a new set of
laws and regulations which represented a fairly well-balanced,
modern synthesis of Western and Chinese laws and customs. Many
of those laws were emulated by the CCP during the Kiangsi
Soviet era (early 1930's) and also exist today on Taiwan.
The general success of law reform during this period
debunks the myths that Chinese are a non-litigious people, as
Confucianist lore would suggest. Unlike the Japanese who have
a far greater tendency to avoid open and disruptive confronta-
tion, the Chinese are more naturally litigation prone. It was
through various customs that Confucian traditions discouraged
and suppressed this nature as magistrates and the bureaucracy
became increasingly unwilling or unable to address legal
concerns in an equitable and judicious manner. But, just as
the Chinese instincts for commerce and self-preservation
negate substantive support for communism, the population will
openly support law reform if they can be convinced that law
and the judiciary can be safeguarded from corruption and
inequities.
30
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BUILDING A NEW SOCIALIST ARKET ECONOMIC STRUCTM1
The fundamental issues in the search for wealth and power
encountered by the Qing, then by the KMT of pre-1949 China,
and subsequently by the KMT on Taiwan, while different in
scale and intensity, remain relatively the same in substance
to those very issues at the core of Chinese development today:
(i) How can China best grapple with the is-
sues and problems associated with foreign
influence, investment, new economic
structures, pressures and trends, and
matters arguably unique to the Chinese
peoples?
(ii) Can China decentralize economic author-
ity, while maintaining a balanced econom-
ic development and social equities in the
distribution of wealth and prosperity?
(iii) To accomplish the above goals, which
approach is more appropriate, a rule of
law or an egalitarian society based on
the rule of man?
There is not and never has been any simple solution to those
issues. But, as expectations and frustrations of the masses
rise, as social order disintegrates in both rural and metro-
politan China, and as increasingly violent personal and
economic-oriented crime pervades all corners of society, once
again China teeters on instability and possibly anarchy.
History, however, has furnished China with a rich juri-
31
-I··--- ·IIC--·- --- __
32
dicial heritage which may provide some answers if not a
solution to some of those ills. When properly analyzed and
understood, that heritage can offer to the new generation of
reformers a legal endowment both relevant to twenty-first
century China and which can help to satisfy Deng's goal of
"building socialism with Chinese characteristics."
Conscious of the challenges confronting China, Deng has
set in motion a pioneering undertaking to pull off major
economic restructuring in the form of a socialist market
economy. Deng seeks to build a new socialist "spiritual"
civilization with Chinese characteristics, which social order
would close the gap between the rich and the poor while open-
ing China wider to the outside world.'3 Essential to the new
order would be a re-engineered people's "democracy" in which
science and technology would be the primary productive forc-
es 44
One cornerstone of the ideological foundation for this
new order and modernization of China is an earlier announced
concept (circa 1980) of "mutually reliant relationships." Of
the several mutually reliant relationships identified by Deng,
most relevant to China today is the relationship among
'4 cite fbis - li peng speech on 4/1/93 ----
"as identified in a speech by Deng on march 31, 1993 and
reenforced by Li Peng in a major speech the following day. See, ..
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economics, politics and law. The proper recognition and
handling of such relationships will allow for the unity of
internal contradictions, the streamlining of government, and
the minimization of bureaucratic interference in economic
development.
Reflective of the significance ascribed to the economic
reform effort, Tong Dalin, one of China's chief economic
architects, is fond of quoting an old Chinese saying:
"The spring wind suddenly comes one night,
and pear flowers blossom on tens of thousands
of trees."
To Tong, the new socialist market economic system exalted by
Deng represents the blossoming of many pear flowers simulta-
neously. Although this blossoming in the filtered moonlight of
new found prosperity is beautiful to behold, will the harvest
bear any edible fruit?
To ensure the successful conversion to a socialist market
economy, China's leaders are turning to the enactment of
economic laws and the establishment of a comprehensive and
sound legal system. A new legal order will provide the people
and government leaders with a more transparent and meaningful
degree of legal guidance, standards, guarantees and
restraints. The success of this effort will rely, to a certain
4
'See speech of Deng in 1980.
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degree, on foreign example and experience, particularly
important if China is to succeed in continuing to improve the
investment environment and in protecting the legitimate
investment rights and interests of foreign businesses operat-
ing in China.
Why does the socialist market economy of China need a
sound legal system? As China moves from a centralized economy
(which relied primarily on administrative means for economic
management, but easily- susceptible to manipulation by individ-
uals) to a free market-oriented environment where the market
dictates economic development, new laws and legal structures
are required in order to prevent economic chaos and to protect
fair competition. Thus, the objective of the new legal order
is to promote the institutionalization and enshrinement of
democracy and a free and open socialist market economy in the
laws of China.46
In the eyes of Qiao Shih, "having laws is better than
having no laws at all." 7 To him and others, legal reform is
a prerequisite to the institutionalization of a socialist
democracy because only through it can one promote political
unity and stability without jeopardizing economic development.
While much of what is said is politically correct jargon,
nevertheless, it signifies a much more fundamental effort to
"4See Qiao Shih speech of April 1, 1993.
'
7See Qiao Shih's speech at ....
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hold together a nation of great diversity and conflicting
priorities: the new legal reform is being structured to
eliminate arbitrary political intervention during this new
phase of the development of a market economy.
Several tactics to accomplish the goals of legal reform
must be adopted: (i) according to Qiao Shih, the old economic
laws, such as the law on joint ventures first promulgated in
1979, are the remnants, "shadows", of a planned economy and
economic intervention; therefore those shadows must be
eliminated; (ii) according to Jiang Zemin, China's previous
political leaders lacked experience in adequately understand-
ing the importance and nature of laws, thereby committing
innumerable leftist mistakes, therefore, those mistakes must
be rectified and new understandings reached; and (iii) China
can no longer afford to become an international pariah, or
else it will be by-passed by international economic develop-
ments. A key impediment to China's international participation
in the immediate past has been the state of its legal system,
or lack thereof. Therefore, its legal system must be compati-
ble with the world order, necessitating judicial reform to
comprehend the legal and legislative experiences of not only
China but also those of foreign countries as well.
To achieve the goals of legal reform, first, the govern-
ment must focus on several categories of law reform: (a)
establishing norms to guide the economic conduct of primary
35
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commercial organizations/bodies, such as corporations; (b)
establishing norms to guide market activities and to maintain
economic order, such as new laws governing securities,
negotiable instruments, fair competition, etc.; (c) establish-
ing norms governing macroscopic economic regulation by the
state, such as those governing currency, foreign exchange and
financial transactions, banks, etc); (d) protecting science
and technology through laws and regulations promoting and
protecting intellectual property; and (e) establishing
criminal norms for those who jeopardize the security, unity
and stability of the socialist market economy. Out of those
laws, a new foundation can be established which will have a
significant impact on the nature of socio-political relation-
ships generally. Within the next five years, at the latest,
the preliminary legal framework establishing the new legal
order must be established if China is to avoid the instability
which lies on the horizon.48
CONCLUSON
Uncontrolled growth of a "Gold-rush" mentality throughout
much of China has exacerbated the traditional problems
associated with Chinese "guanxi" (relations building among
men) and, as a result, such materialism has eroded signifi-
'See the speech dated 3/31/93 ..
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cantly the central core of CCP legitimacy. It is easy to
understand why, then, the heart of the new reform effort
should emanate an energy which will revive a "spiritual"
civilization through the creation of a more clearly defined
legal order, which order will "punish corruption and promote
a diligent and clean administration in a serious manner.""9
A more impersonal law is once again the most appropriate
vehicle with which to control economic relationships rather
than having business development solely dictated by political
considerations. In this way, Chinese leadership can more
properly align economic development with certain historical
tenets which have proven successful in addressing similar
goals and objectives throughout the prior millennium. To the
Chinese people, who ascribe significantly more value to
commercial freedom and prosperity than to their political
freedom, there does exist a material difference between a rule
of law which can promote economic equity through a system of
defined checks and balances and a rule of man which permits,
if not encourages, ubiquitous abuse and rampant corruption in
a Chinese environment where custom inevitably tends to encour-
age personal excesses and abuses as the populace competes for
limited wealth and power.
For the ancient Chinese culture which has witnessed
49See the Government Work Report given by Premier Li Peng on
April 1, 1993 .....
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customs and human relationships become firmly entrenched in
the fabric of that society, reform, to be meaningful and
lasting, requires a change in the direction of tutelage
provided by the state. The more susceptible a people are to a
rule of man, the more imperative it becomes that, somewhere
along the reform continuum, there is established a more
rational counterbalancing and equitable rule of law so as to
solidify order and opportunity in the search for wealth and
power. The excesses and abuses of communist rule make the
realization of that rule of law all the more urgent.
Once the orientation of the political tutelage of the CCP
can be recalibrated through a rule of law, then the excesses
and abuses of communist rule, especially those lingering from
the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Incident, can be
addressed more naturally. Issues and concerns for such abuses,
especially in the area of "human rights" can and should be
better left to more subtle reform efforts once the new legal
order is established. For now, pressures on the Chinese
government would be better served if focused, in part, on
encouraging Deng and others aggressively to continue down the
path which seeks to establish decisively a rule of law and not
of man. After all, how better to address human concerns than
to promote the establishment of a fair and equitable judiciary
which will enforce constitutional and other legal rights.
Recent history, of the 1910's - 1930's, reveals that such a
38
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reform movement is highly possible to maintain. The link with
past abuses and excesses can be broken with creative thinking
and an appreciation of the true nature and motivation behind
China's onward search for wealth and power.
China's leadership must be encouraged and then allowed to
shed themselves of the baggage of their recent past. Along the
way, international efforts should be focused on the establish-
ment in China of a new relational model for sustaining order,
and then cleanly overcoming the hurdles encountered prior to
1949 in providing prosperity for the many and not the few.
Otherwise, China will find itself stumbling down a path far
more treacherous than that encountered in the CIS today. As
revealed in the recent successes of Taiwanese and Singaporean
economic development, law can and must enable China to harness
its productive forces in such a manner that allows wealth and
prosperity to be achieved and spread more uniformly throughout
China. Then, once the market economy takes root, law reform
and the rule of law could become an end unto itself and take
the paternalistic socialist democracy down a path unintended
by Deng, but not necessarily incompatible with Chinese
history.
Legal reform is also a prerequisite for providing a
degree of stability to an investment environment which may
otherwise experience significant socio-political nationalistic
transition, as is emerging throughout the rest of the Asia-
39
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Pacific region. We are facing an era which requires great
fluidity in policy thinking but without causing foreign
companies to withdraw those investments which help to provide
the opportunity for a more peaceful transition.
So long as a rule of law can continue to materialize
unimpeded in China then any degree of military posturing of
the PLA against Taiwan, Hong Kong, or other economies will not
have the deleterious effect which it would otherwise have in
extremely unnavigable waters. The challenge to the U.S. and
our companies is to maintain a firm but consistently fair
position on trade and investment-related issues without
alienating the Chinese by what they may view as a "scorched
earth" policy of trade sanctions or forced, unnatural change.
In part, it is incumbent for U.S. policy makers to
develop a new, creative approach to Chinese relations which
fully comprehends the analogies to be drawn from Chinese
history. Similarly, we need to abandon, once and for all, the
"Open Door" approach of the early twentieth century, which in
many respects our trade policy today vis-a-vis China has once
again become.I Open Door rhetoric and indecisiveness of
policy makers could prove fatal in Sino-American relationships
"History of American diplomacy in the Far East from 1903 -
1938 recapitulates in a series of cycles the experience of John Hay
[and the Open Door Policy]. One after another, with variation only
in the manner and emphasis, the Presidents and Secretaries of State
who followed McKinley and Hay have moved toward identical objec-
tives with identical results." Quoted by A. Whitney Griswold,
40
41
and unwittingly kill the natural development of a rule-of-law
society let alone destroy a naturally fertile environment for
U.S. investment (even if investment incentives should disap-
pear).
A "sea of change" is occurring throughout the Asia-
Pacific region, but not for the same reasons given by
Abegglen. It is not just a shift of Japan to Asia-Pacific, but
more importantly a return to China as the center of Asia-
Pacific economic development. China is fast approaching (if
not already there in certain areas such as Shanghai) a period
of economic growth which will place renewed emphasis on
consumption and technological advancement. The concurrent
developments of structural renovation in the coastal cities
and other regions juxtaposed with great strides in technologi-
cal advancement emerging from China's research institutes and
academia is unprecedented. Sustenance for such development
will draw from several sources, not the least of which is
China's long legal heritage. This metamorphosis will continue,
however, regardless of what form U.S. trade and investment
policies take. Therefore, the real risk is whether U.S.
industry can continue to play an integral role in Chinese
economic development. The answer will be yes, but only if we
become more Chinese in our approach to doing business and drop
our insistence that China become more western over time.
(c) RLThurston, 1995
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